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We revisit to what extent the increase in income inequality over the last 30 years has been mirrored
by consumption inequality.  We do so by constructing two alternative measures of consumption expenditure,
using data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CE). We first use reports of active savings and
after tax income to construct the measure of consumption implied by the budget constraint.  We find
that the consumption inequality implied by savings behavior largely tracks income inequality between
1980 and 2007.   Second, we use a demand system to correct for systematic measurement error in
the CE's expenditure data.  Specifically,  we consider trends in the relative expenditure of high income
and low income households for different goods with different income (total expenditure) elasticities.
Our estimation exploits the difference in the growth rate of luxury consumption inequality versus
necessity consumption inequality. This "double-differencing,'' which we implement in a a regression
framework, corrects for mis-measurement that can systematically vary over time by good and income
group.  This second exercise indicates that consumption inequality has closely tracked income inequality
over the period 1980-2007.  Both of our measures show a significantly greater increase in consumption














We revisit the issue of whether the increase in income inequality over the last 30 years
has translated into a quantitatively similar increase in consumption inequality. Contrary to
several inuential studies discussed below, we nd that consumption inequality has closely
tracked income inequality over the period 1980-2007. Like most of the previous literature that
argues the opposite, we base our conclusions on the Consumer Expenditure Survey's (CE)
interview survey. However, we focus on two new measures of consumption that under our
stated assumptions adjust for the systematic measurement error in the CE. The rst measure
is the CE's data on savings, from which we calculate consumption via the budget constraint.
The second is a demand system, from which we estimate relative consumption growth using
relative expenditures on luxuries and necessities. Both measures show a substantial increase
in consumption inequality, similar in magnitude to the increase in income inequality.
An inuential paper by Krueger and Perri (2006), building on related work by Slesnick
(2001), uses the CE to argue that consumption inequality has not kept pace with income
inequality.1 In an exercise similar to Krueger and Perri's, we show that relative after-tax
income inequality increased by 33 percent (.33 log points) between 1980 and 2007, where our
conservative measure of income inequality is the ratio of those in the 80-95th percentiles to
those in the 5-20th percentiles.2 The corresponding increase in consumption inequality for
the same two groups is 17 percent.
We reassess these facts using two alternative measures. Our rst exercise is simply
budget constraint accounting. The mirror image of the dierential trends between income
and consumption inequality in the CE is a growing gap in savings favoring high income
households. Based on reported consumption expenditures, the high income group increased
their savings rate from 25 percent to 38 percent between 1980 and 2007, while the low income
group maintained a savings rate of roughly -30 percent over this period. The implied savings
rates using CE income and consumption are implausible. For the overall mean, the implied
savings rate in the CE increases from 10 percent in 1980 to over 20 percent in 2007. This
contrasts with savings out of disposable income reported in the ow of funds accounts, which
falls from 10 percent to almost zero, as well as is inconsistent with other micro data sets
(see Bosworth and Anders, 2008 and Bosworth and Smart, 2009). This discrepancy is in line
with the well documented decline in aggregate consumption reported in the CE relative to
1For other contributions to this literature, see Blundell and Preston (1998), Blundell et al. (2008), and
Heathcote et al. (2010).
2For the period 1980-2004, Krueger and Perri (2006) report a log change in the 90/10 income ratio of
approximately 0.36 for income, and 0.16 for consumption.
2NIPA (e.g., Garner et al., 2006.)
In addition to expenditures and income, the CE asks detailed questions on savings ows
directly. These questions include net payments of loans, changes in deposit balances, pur-
chases of stocks, etc. The average reported savings rate in the CE declines over time, con-
sistent with ow of funds and NIPA, but in contrast to the savings rate implied by the CE's
consumption data. Calculating implied expenditure as income minus savings, we obtain an
increase in relative consumption inequality of 28 percent, which is substantially closer to the
relative change in disposable income of 33 percent than that implied by reported expendi-
ture. The CE's savings measures are noisy (particularly regarding new mortgages), and so
we view them primarily as a consistency check on the reported consumption data, and only
secondarily as an independent measure of consumption itself.
Our preferred measure of consumption inequality uses the CE's expenditure data, but
corrects for systematic measurement error. Our modeling of measurement error is fairly
general. In particular, we allow for time-dependent multiplicative measurement error that is
good specic as well as income-group specic. The former allows for the mis-measurement
of particular goods to vary over time, such as the possibility that the under-reporting of
luxuries has increased relative to the under-reporting of necessities. The latter allows for the
measurement to be income-group specic, such as the possibility that the under-reporting
of expenditure of high income households across all goods has increased relative to the
under-reporting by low income households. This modeling of measurement error captures
systematic mis-measurement that is correlated with the characteristics of the good and the
income-characteristics of the households. We also allow for mis-measurement at the level
of good-income group interaction (clothing of the rich versus clothing of the poor), but
restrict this joint mis-measurement to be independent of the characteristics of the goods, in
particular the good's income (total expenditure) elasticity.
Our estimation procedure consists of two steps. First, we estimate good-specic total
expenditure elasticities using a simple log-linear demand system. To do this, we use the
1972-73 CE, separating our rst stage sample from the post-1980 period of focus. In the
second stage, we consider the dierence in expenditure growth across goods and across
income groups. To see how this approach addresses mis-measurement, take expenditures on
food at home (a necessity) versus nondurable entertainment (a luxury) as an example. The
relative expenditure on food at home across income groups remained essentially constant
between 1980 and 2007. Given a non-zero estimated expenditure elasticity of 0.5 for food
at home, this suggests zero change in relative total expenditures. While comparing the
same good across income groups controls for (multiplicative) mis-measurement of food in
3each period, it does not control for the possible mis-measurement correlated with income.
For this, we can add a second good, nondurable entertainment. Over the same period, the
high income-low income ratio of expenditure on nondurable entertainment increased by 0.75
log points. Given an estimated elasticity of 2.0 for entertainment, this implies a change in
relative expenditure of 38 percent. Again, this controls for good-specic measurement error,
but not mis-measurement correlated with income. However, any mis-measurement that is
specic to income groups, but that is uniform across goods, can be eliminated by dierencing
across goods. That is, the dierence in relative expenditure growth rates will equal the
dierence in expenditure elasticities times the change in total expenditure inequality (plus
an idiosyncratic error term). Solving this equation, the relative growth in these two goods
implies a change in consumption inequality of 48 percent. Our procedure is thus a dierence-
in-dierence estimate, where one dierence eliminates good-specic mis-measurement and
the second dierence eliminates income group-specic mis-measurement.
While food and entertainment are interesting due to their extreme income elasticities, the
CE data contains expenditure on many goods. We therefore implement this procedure using
all goods in a regression framework. Our estimates suggest that consumption inequality
increased by 30 percent between 1980 and 2007, approximately the same as the change in
income inequality, and even larger than that obtained from the budget constraint accounting.
We nd this estimate is stable across dierent subsets of goods, dierent weighting schemes
across goods, and alternative rst-stage elasticity estimates.
We also consider trends in inequality in dierent sub-periods. We nd that income
inequality increased by 20 percent between 1980 and the mid-1990s, and then by an additional
13 percent between 1995 and 2007. The inequality in reported CE expenditure increased by
13 percent in the rst sub-period, and then by 4 percent in the latter half of the sample.
Reported consumption inequality does not keep pace with income inequality in either sub-
period. Using our demand system estimates, we nd that consumption inequality increased
by roughly 19 percent between 1980 and the mid-1990s, and then by additional 13 percent
through 2007, for a total increase of 32 percent. These estimates more closely track the prole
of income inequality, with a larger increase in the 1980s, and a smaller but still signicant
increase thereafter.
We are not the rst to reassess trends in consumption inequality, particularly with a
focus on mis-measurement of CE interview expenditures. Attanasio et al. (2005) use the
diary component of the CE to correct for mis-measurement in the interview survey, and
document a large increase in consumption inequality. Their analysis does not extend back
to the 1980s due to data limitations. Our analysis uses interview survey data, but brings in
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mis-measurement. Our paper is complementary to an independent eort by Parker et al.
(2009), who focus on the gap between CE expenditures and those reported by NIPA to
obtain a corrected estimate of consumption inequality.
There is a large literature concerning consumption inequality that precedes or is not
focused on the issues raised by Slesnick and Krueger and Perri. An important paper by
Attanasio and Davis (1996) documents that the increase in the college premium observed
for wages in the 1980s is mirrored by similar increases in consumption inequality. However,
Attanasio and Davis (1996) do not address the relative trends within education groups,
which is where Krueger and Perri (2006) show the conict between income and consumption
inequality trends is starkest. Other important papers in this earlier literature include Cutler
and Katz (1992) and Blundell and Preston (1998). Sabelhaus and Groen (2000) also discuss
mis-measurement in the context of the relationship of consumption and income. For trends
in inequality for a number of countries and time periods, see the papers collected in Krueger
et al. (2010). There is also a large literature on consumption versus income inequality over
the life cycle, starting with Deaton and Paxson (1994).3 These papers often use the CE for
consumption data, and are therefore subject to the measurement error problems addressed
in this paper. We leave the question of whether our approach has implications for trends in
life cycle inequality to future research.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data set; sec-
tion 3 analyzes the CE's savings data; section 4 performs our main demand-system analysis;
section 5 contains a discussion of potential mis-specication and concludes.
2 Data
In this section we describe our data set, leaving to the data appendix a more detailed discus-
sion of variable construction and our sample. Our data is from the Consumer Expenditure
Survey's interview sample. This is a well known consumption survey that has been conducted
continuously since 1980. We also use the earlier waves of 1972 and 1973 for estimation of
the demand system. (The survey was not conducted between 1973 and 1980.)
The survey is large, consisting of over 5,000 households in most waves. Each household is
assigned a \replicate" weight designed to map the CE sample into the national population,
3See also, Storesletten et al. (2004), Heathcote et al. (2005), Guvenen (2007), Huggett et al. (2009), and
Aguiar and Hurst (2009).
5which we use in all calculations. An initial interview collects information about household
characteristics as well as other baseline information. Each household is then re-interviewed
once a quarter for up to four consecutive quarters, which we refer to as interviews 1 through 4.
Each interview records expenditures on detailed categories over the preceding three months.
The nal interview also updates income and demographic information for the preceding
12 months. For income and demographics, we use the responses from the last interview.
Income, expenditure, and savings variables are all recorded at the household level. Demo-
graphics such as age, sex, and education, are those reported by the \reference person," who
is identied by the response to the question who owns or rents the house. We dene in-
come and expenditures at the household level, rather than creating adult equivalence scales.
However, when estimating household demand equations we control for demographic dummy
variables that reect the number of household members, number of household earners, and
the reference member's age.
On the income side, we use the CE measures of total household labor earnings, total
household income before tax, and total household income after tax. These variables are re-
ported in the last interview and cover the previous 12 months. Before-tax income in the CE
includes labor earnings, non-farm or farm business income, social security and retirement
benets, social security insurance, unemployment benets, workers' compensation, welfare
(including food stamps), nancial income, rental income, alimony and child support, and
scholarships. Our measure of before-tax income is that reported in the CE, but we add in
food as pay and other money receipts (lump sum receipts from estates, gambling winnings,
proceeds from the sale of personal items, etc.). For consistency, as we count receipts of al-
imony and child support as income, we subtract o payments of alimony and child support.
Finally, as rental equivalence is a consumption expenditure for home owners, but not out
of pocket housing expenses (mortgage interest, property taxes, insurance, repairs and main-
tenance, etc.), we include rental equivalence minus out-of-pocket housing costs as part of
before tax income as well. Our measure of after tax income deducts personal taxes from our
measure of before tax income. These taxes are federal income taxes, state and local taxes,
and payroll taxes. (We include government retirement and railroad retirement contributions
as payroll taxes.) Note that federal income taxes can be negative, especially as they capture
earned income credits. We consider an alternative measure of after tax income by replacing
self-reported federal income taxes with taxes calculated from the NBER's TAXSIM program.
We discuss those results as a robustness check in section 3.
The CE asks respondents a number of questions on active savings. For example, they
record net ows to savings accounts, purchases of assets (including houses and business),
6payments of mortgages, payments of loans, purchases and sales of vehicles, etc. The de-
tailed components of savings are reported in the data appendix. The CE records the total
outstanding credit balances in the 1st and 4th interviews, which are 9 months apart. From
this, we calculate net payments of credit by taking the dierence and scaling up to an an-
nual measure by 4/3. The other net worth items are reported as ows and do not require
dierencing across interviews.
While the CE contains fairly rich data on savings, it is designed to measure consumption
and not savings. We use the savings data primarily as a consistency check, via the budget
constraint, on reported consumption. As we show in section 3, the average saving rate
reported in the CE appears to be broadly consistent with that obtained from the ow of
funds or national income accounts, although there are marked dierences. In particular, the
data on new mortgages in the CE raise the question of whether the CE accurately records the
net eect of renancing on savings. The CE data implies sharp up-ticks in new mortgages
around 1993 and in the 2000s, which is consistent with published statistics on renancing.
However, there are a number of reported new mortgages without a corresponding purchase of
a house or a signicant paying down of an existing mortgage. New mortgages for households
who do not purchase a home are on average nearly 14 times the reported reductions to
existing mortgages. In particular, the CE data imply an average \cash out" percentage of
73 percent from new mortgages not associated with a house purchase. This high rate is not
supported by other studies of renancing, which suggest that roughly 13 percent of the new
mortgage is taken out as cash and the remainder is used to pay o existing mortgages and
related costs (see Greenspan and Kennedy, 2007).
These questionable transactions, while not many in number, nevertheless aect the mean
savings rate due to their size. To address this potential measurement error, we identify
questionable new mortgages as those that are greater than 1.5 times the sum of the purchase
price of a new house plus any lump sum payments or reductions to existing mortgages. Only
7 percent of the sample has a questionable new mortgage, but roughly three quarters of the
new mortgages fall into this category. For these mortgages, we top code the amount of the
mortgage as the sum of the full amount of any house purchase plus the payment on existing
mortgages plus one third the reported mortgage amount. This implies that at most one third
of the new mortgage amount is taken out as cash. This reduces the average implied \cash
out" ratio of renanced mortgages to 14 percent, consistent with the number reported by
Greenspan and Kennedy (2007). In what follows, we typically present two savings series, the
raw series using reported mortgages (labeled \unadjusted") and the alternative series which
uses the adjusted mortgages (labeled \adjusted"). As documented in section 3, it turns out
7that the adjustment aects mean savings rates, but does not have a signicant impact on
the consumption inequality implied by the budget constraint.
The CE reports expenditure on hundreds of separate items. We aggregate these into 20
groups, which are listed in table 2. The division of expenditures into groups is governed by
several criteria. The rst is to respect BLS categorization of similar goods. The second is to
dene groups broadly enough to ensure consistency across the various waves of the survey.
The third is to dene groups narrowly enough that they span a wide range of expenditure
elasticities. We adhere to the groupings created by the BLS in published statistics with a
couple of exceptions. We have grouped telephone equipment and services with appliances,
computers, and related services rather than with utilities, based on our prior regarding
expenditure elasticities. We combine expenditure on reading materials with other nondurable
entertainment expenditures because alone it represents a trivial expenditure share (about
0.2%).
For expenditure on housing services, we use rent paid for renters and self-reported rental
equivalence for home owners. For the eight quarterly surveys conducted in 1980 and 1981
households were not asked about rental equivalence. We impute the rental equivalence for
homeowners in these early waves based on non-housing expenditures as well as demographics.
In particular, we use the the two years of surveys conducted in 1982 and 1983 and regress
reported rental equivalence on total expenditures minus out of pocket housing expenditure,
after tax income, and a set of dummies for age, marital status, family size, and number of
earners. We then t this regression for the earlier waves that do not report a housing service
measure.
For durables other than housing we use direct expenditure, and do not impute service
ows. This is motivated by our use of income groups as the unit of analysis (described
below), and the assumption that aggregating over many households provides a good proxy
for the consumption of durable services at a point in time. We show in section 4 that our
estimates are not sensitive to the exclusion of housing and other durables.
Reported expenditures on food at home are notably lower for the 1982 to 1987 CE waves.
This disparity appears to reect dierent wording in the questionnaire for those years. To
adjust for this drop, we increase food at home expenditure by 11% for these years. This
11% adjustment is derived from a regression for surveys 1980 to 1989 of log food at home
expenditures on log after-tax income, log total expenditure, quadratic time trends, and a
zero/one dummy variable that equals one for years 1982 to 1987. This adjustment is similar
to that employed by Krueger and Perri (2006).
8Income, saving, and household total expenditures are expressed in constant 1983 dollars
using the CPI-U. Note that we use the aggregate CPI to deate total expenditures, and
do not deate separately by expenditure category. This keeps all elements of the budget
constraint in the same units. All results based on individual expenditure categories are
expressed for one set of households relative to others (e.g., high versus low income) at a
point in time, so price deation is not an issue.
We aggregate expenditures for each household across the four interviews, so each house-
hold appears once in the sample. We assign households to years based on the month of the
rst interview, with households starting the survey in the fourth calendar quarter assigned
to the next year.
CE survey waves from 1981 through 1983 include only urban households, and so for
consistency we restrict our analysis to urban residents for the entire sample period. Our
analysis employs the following further restrictions on the CE urban samples, both for the
1980-2007 and 1972-1973 samples. First, we restrict households to those with reference
persons between the ages of 25 and 64. Second, we only use households who participate in all
four interviews, as our income measure and most savings questions are only asked in the nal
interview. Third, we restrict the sample to those which the CE labels as \complete income
reporters," which corresponds to households with at least one non-zero response to any of
the income and benets questions. Fourth, we eliminate households that report unusually
large expenditures on our smaller categories. In particular, we exclude any household that
records spending more than half of after tax income on any category, with the exception of
housing, food, and vehicle purchases. Finally, to eliminate outliers and mitigate any time-
varying impact of top-coding, we exclude households in the top and bottom ve percent
of the before tax income distribution. (The extent of top coding dictates the ve percent
trimming.) We are left with 9,845 households for the 1972-73 sample, and 55,003 households
for the period 1980-2007. The data appendix details how many households are eliminated
at each step.
From this sample, we divide households into 5 bins based on before tax income, with
the respective bins containing the 5-20, 20-40, 40-60, 60-80, and 80-95 percentile groups,
respectively. For each income group and each year, we average expenditure, income, and
savings variables across the member households, using the household sampling weights. Our
primary measure of inequality is the ratio of the mean of the top income group to the mean
of the bottom income group. When estimating the expenditure elasticities, reported in table
2 below, we control for demographics. To do this, we further divide each income group into
18 demographic cells, based on age range (25-37, 38-50, 51-64), number of earners (<2, 2+),
9and household size ( 2, 3-4, 5+). The analysis is done by averaging within each cell and
weighting the cell by the sum of the underlying household sampling weights.
3 Budget Constraint Accounting
In this section, we review the trends in income and consumption inequality using our CE
sample. We then discuss the CE savings rates, and introduce our rst alternative measure
of consumption based on the budget constraint.
3.1 Trends in Income and Consumption Inequality
We begin with labor earnings. The top line in gure 1 depicts the trend in labor earnings
inequality. As discussed in section 2, inequality is the ratio of the mean for the top income
cells to the mean for the bottom income cells. Keep in mind that the allocation of respondents
into the high and low income groups is based on before tax income, and so the cells are the
same for all lines in gure 1. There is substantial year-to-year movement, reecting in large
part sampling error, so we average over multiple years in table 1. In particular, we look at
the three multi-year periods 1980-82, 1992-1995, and 2005-2007. For the 1980-1982 period,
average household labor earnings in 1983 dollars was $44,995 for our top income group
and $7,002 for our bottom income group, for a ratio of 6.43. Labor earnings for the top
income group grew by 30 percent (in log points) through 2007, while labor earnings for the
low income grew by 10 percent, resulting in a ratio of 7.88 in 2005-2007. This implies an
increase in earnings inequality of 20 log points over the full period. The increase in inequality
from 1980-82 to the mid 1992-1995 period is even larger at 29 percent. But this is largely
driven by years 1992-1993 which, from gure 1 appear as outliers for earnings.
The next line in gure 1 is before tax income. Inequality in this broader measure of income
is lower at each point in time, but also shows a steady increase over time. In particular,
this ratio increases from 4.76 in 1980-82 to 6.40 in 2005-2007, for an increase of 30 percent
over this period. This change is reported in the second row of table 1. Inequality in total
household income, after deducting taxes, grew by slightly more than before tax income, with
an increase of 33 percent over the sample period (Row 2 of table 1). As a robustness check
on the CE measure of after tax income, we computed federal income taxes using the NBER's
TAXSIM program, and used this in place of the CE's self-reported income tax to calculate
after tax income from before tax income. This alternative measure of after tax income
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change of 28 points. This exercise suggests that respondents in the CE are under-reporting
the progressivity of federal income taxes relative to TAXSIM, and this gap is increasing over
time. Nevertheless, the dierences do not substantially change the conclusion that income
inequality increased signicantly over this period, on the order of 30 percent.4
Figure 1 also depicts consumption inequality between the top income group and the
bottom income group. The increase is much less than that of earnings or income, the feature
highlighted in Krueger and Perri (2006). In table 1, we see that consumption inequality
increased by only 17 percent over the full period, with 13 percent of that change occurring in
the rst half of the sample. The decline of CE measured consumption relative to NIPA varies
across goods. If under-measurement becomes more problematic for luxuries over time, this
could bias downward any measured rise in consumption inequality. However, this does not
appear to be the case. In gure 1 we adjust consumption expenditures to ensure that good-
by-good CE aggregates track those from the national income accounts, using proportional
adjustment factors from Meyer and Sullivan (2009). This has little impact, as the two
measures of consumption inequality are nearly identical. As stated in the introduction,
our nding that inequality in expenditures has risen much less than income inequality is
consistent with a number of papers in the literature.5
We have also computed inequality relative to the middle income group, which represents
the 40th to 60th percentiles. For simplicity, we will refer to this as the 50th percentile.
The 30 percent increase in before tax income inequality reported in table 1 can be broken
down into an increase of 19 percent for the 90-50 ratio, and 11 percent for the 50-10 ratio.
Similarly, the 33 percent increase in after tax income inequality is composed of a 20 percent
increase for the 90-50 ratio and 14 percent increase for the 50-10 ratio. For consumption, the
17 percent increase is due to a 13 percent increase in the 90-50 ratio and a 4 percent increase
in the 50-10 ratio. That is, there is very little reported increase in consumption inequality
in the bottom half of the sample.
4The rise in income inequality we observe in the CE is broadly consistent with patterns in other data.
Meyer and Sullivan (2009) measure income inequality using income information in the Current Population
Surveys (CPS). There are dierences in methodology from our approach; for instance, their statistics adjust
for family size using equivalence scales. Nevertheless, they show for 1980-2007 an increase in the 90-10
dierential in after tax income of 27 percent. Heathcote et al. (2010) also examine after tax income based
on CPS data, but report a larger increase in the 90-10 dierential for 1980-2005 of a little over 50 percent.
5 For instance, Meyer and Sullivan (2009) show an increase in the 90-10 dierential in consumption
expenditure for their CE sample of only about 10 percent for 1980 to 2007, or about a third of the rise they
see in the 90-10 dierential for after tax income over those years in the CPS. Heathcote et al. (2010) show an
increase in the 90-10 dierential in consumption expenditure for their CE sample for 1980 to 2006 of about
17 percent, similar to our number. But that is also only about a third as large as the rise they see in the
90-10 dierential for after tax income over those years in their CPS sample.
113.2 Saving Rates
We now turn to implied and observed saving rates, beginning with mean saving rates. Figure
2 depicts the personal saving rate reported in the ow of funds accounts.6 There is a clear
downward trend in this series, starting from 12.2 percent for 1980-82 and falling to 1.7
percent for 2005-07. This downward trend in the personal saving rate is well known, and is
similar to that implied by the national income accounts.
The implied savings rate in the CE data can be computed as one minus the mean ratio
of consumption expenditures to mean after tax income. This series is also depicted in gure
2. The implied saving rate has a dramatically dierent trend, increasing from 12.5 percent
for 1980-82 to 23.2 percent for 2005-07. This sharp increase in implied savings is at odds
with the ow of funds or national income accounts, and is the counterpart to the previously
discussed increasing gap between CE and NIPA expenditure. Because inequality in CE
expenditures rises only half as much as income inequality, the data imply a large rise in the
dispersion in implied savings rates between high income and low income groups: For the top
income group the implied savings rates increases dramatically from 27 percent for 1980-82
to 38 percent for 2005-07, while for the bottom group is nearly unchanged, going from -26
to -25 percent.
Although the trend in CE consumption expenditure is far below that seen in national
accounts, this does not necessarily imply that the CE fails to depict accurately trends in
consumption inequality. For example, if the CE's ability to capture expenditures has declined
by the same multiplicative factor for all income groups, then the mis-measurement will not
bias our ratio-based measures of consumption inequality. However, such a scenario has
somewhat extreme implications for relative saving rates. That is, suppose we uniformly
increase expenditure across groups in 2005-07 to generate a decline of 10.5 points in the
aggregate CE savings rate, which is the decline observed in the ow of funds. This implies
an adjustment factor of 28 percent.7 Given that
Savings
Income = 1  
Consumption
Income , this implies a
downward adjustment of saving rates that is 28 percent times the consumption to income
ratio. Because the consumption-income ratio is much higher for low income groups, it
6Specically, the saving rate is personal saving without consumer durables divided by disposable income.
A similar pattern is obtained using the national income and product accounts, where savings is disposable
personal income minus personal outlays.
7Specically, let  denote our adjustment factor, so we increase consumption by a factor of (1 + )
uniformly across households. The adjustment to the saving rate is:  S
Y =   C
Y . To match the 10.5 point
decline in the saving rate observed in the ow of funds, the aggregate CE saving must be adjusted down
by 21.2 points in 2005-2007. As the ratio of aggregate CE consumption to income in 2005-2007 is 0.767, an
adjustment factor of 27.6 percent is required: ( 0:276)(0:767) =  0:212.
12requires an extreme decline in their savings rate. In particular, the implied savings rate
for top income group must decline modestly from 27 percent for 1980-82 to 21 percent for
2005-07, while for the bottom group is must go from -26 all the way down to -59 percent.8
We would suggest that such a trend decline in savings rate for the bottom group is extreme,
especially given that income is dened to include transfers and given that the very lowest
income households are trimmed from the sample.
Figure 2 also reports the saving rate constructed from the CE's savings data. The se-
ries labeled \unadjusted" is the sample mean of reported savings divided by mean after tax
income for each year. The mean savings rate falls from 3 percent in 1980 to -20 percent
at the end of the sample. This decline is nearly a mirror image of the increase implied by
consumption data, implying an inconsistency between the CE's consumption, income, and
savings data that is increasing over time. The decline, while of the right sign, is much larger
than that obtained from ow of funds accounts. As mentioned in section 2, there is a mea-
surement issue concerning new mortgages, which underlies the large decline generally, and
the sharp swings around 1993 and 2003 in particular. As described in section 2, we construct
an alternative savings series designed to address the mis-reporting of new mortgages. This
series is the \adjusted" series in gure 2, which more closely tracks ow of funds savings and
eliminates part of the sharp downward spikes in savings in the mid-1990s and 2000s.
While mean savings rates are a useful check on the data, we are primarily interested in
relative consumption. Using the budget constraint, we can use reported income and savings
at the household level to construct an alternative measure of consumption. Specically, we
dene implied consumption as after tax income minus reported savings, which is denoted
Y   S in gure 1 and table 1. Starting with table 1, the unadjusted savings data implies
an increase in consumption inequality of 19 percent between 1980 and 1995, and 28 percent
for the full sample. The adjusted savings implies similar trends in consumption inequality,
with increases of 13 and 26 percent, respectively. Both series suggest a greater increase in
consumption inequality than that implied by reported expenditure. In particular, the 16
point gap between the increase in after tax income and consumption inequality (33 versus
17) is reduced to about a 5 point gap.9
8These numbers are obtained as follows. The ratio of consumption to income for the high income group
averages 62 percent for 2005-2007, the adjustment lowers the saving rate of the high income group by (-
0.276)(0.618)=0.171. That is, the saving rate of the high income group is adjusted down from 38 percent
to 21 percent. The consumption-income ratio for the low income group is 1.25, and the adjustment to the
saving rate is therefore -0.34, requiring an adjustment of the saving rate from -25 percent to -59 percent.
9For reference, we also computed Y   S using the after tax income calculated using TAXSIM's federal
income tax. The increase in implied consumption inequality is 25 percent using unadjusted savings and 20
percent using adjusted savings. The modestly smaller increase in inequality reects that this alternative
after tax income measure also displays a smaller increase in inequality.
13Figure 1 depicts the ratio of high income to low income consumption implied by reported
savings for each year. Given that the unadjusted and adjusted savings series yield nearly
identical trends in inequality, we only plot the adjusted series to avoid clutter. The savings-
implied consumption inequality tracks income inequality quite closely, and is dierent in
both level and trend from the reported consumption data.
Moreover, recall from the previous sub-section that the increase in consumption inequality
was particularly small for the 50-10 ratio. For Y   S, there is more balance across the top
and bottom of the income distribution. In particular, the overall increase of 26 percent for
the adjusted Y  S is composed of a 12 percent increase in the 90-50 ratio and a 14 percent
increase in the 50-10 ratio.
As previously emphasized, reported savings is not a focus of the CE, and one may rea-
sonably question conclusions drawn solely from reported savings. Our primary focus is to
use the savings data as a consistency check on the CE's consumption data. It turns out
that the savings data tell a much dierent story regarding consumption inequality than do
the expenditure data. This inconsistency raises the question of whether the expenditure
data is subject to systematic measurement error that biases our estimates of consumption
inequality. Addressing this potential measurement error is the focus of the next section.
4 Demand System Estimates of Consumption Inequal-
ity
In this section we present our main results. We rst discuss how our econometric method-
ology corrects for several classes of mis-measurement. We then estimate a simple demand
system which we use to generate our estimates of consumption inequality growth.
4.1 Econometric Approach
To set notation, let the index h = 1;:::;H, represent cells dened by income and demograph-
ics as described in section 2. Let i = 1;:::;I denote the I = 5 income groups. With 18
demographic groups for each of the 5 income group, we have H = 90. Let j = 1;:::J index
our J = 20 goods; and let t index time (year). With this notation, let xhjt denote reported
expenditure on good j at time t by income-demographic group h, where we average over
households in each cell using the CE replication weights. Let Xht denote total expenditure
14at time t by group h; that is, Xht =
PJ
j=1 xhjt.
We assume that xhjt is measured with error, with the degree of mis-measurement de-
pending on time, income group, and good. Note that this is the systematic measurement
error that survives averaging across households within each income-demographic group. In
particular, let x










t reects mis-measurement of consumption good j at time t that is common across re-
spondents (e.g., food may be under-reported for all households); i
t represents mis-measurement
specic to i at time t that is common across goods (e.g., the rich may under-report all expen-
ditures); and vhjt is good-group specic measurement error (e.g., food expenditures of the
rich are under-reported). We assume that vhjt is classical measurement error; in particular,
it is independent of the characteristics of good j and group h at each date t. Without loss
of generality (given the presence of  
j
t and i
t), we normalize the mean of vhjt to be zero for
all t.
Our estimation consists of two steps. First, we estimate the total expenditure elasticities
for each good. We assume that Engel curves are log-linear and so expenditure elasticities are
constant. Of course, this can only be true locally, unless all elasticities are one. Nevertheless,
it provides a tractable framework to address the mis-measurement of expenditure in the CE.





jt + j lnX

ht +  jZh + 'hjt: (2)
The term Zh is a vector of demographic dummies corresponding to age, number of earners
per household, and family size, reecting the categories used to construct the demographic
cells. We allow the coecient vector on demographics  j to vary across goods. The error
term 'hjt represents idiosyncratic relative taste shocks which we assume are independent of
total expenditure and independent of expenditure elasticities j.
We estimate expenditure elasticities using the 1972-73 Consumer Expenditure Survey.
Using the early sample allows us to separate estimation of the expenditure elasticities from
the estimation of the implied growth in total consumption expenditures post-1980. Speci-
cally, let t = 0 denote observations from 1972 and 1973. We estimate expenditure elasticities
using observed expenditures:
lnxhj0 = j0 + j lnXh0 +  jZh + uhj0; (3)
15where jt  
jt + 
j




0 + vhj0 + 'hj0: (4)
We pool the years 1972 and 1973, but allow for a dierent good-specic intercept for each
year.
A concern with estimating a demand system like (3) is that mis-measurement of individ-
ual goods is cumulated into total expenditure, inducing correlation between the measurement
error captured in the residual and observed total expenditure. A standard technique is to
instrument total expenditure with income and other proxies for total expenditure. However,
we are already using income-category averages, which eliminates measurement error uncor-
related with income. Nevertheless, as modeled above, there may be measurement error that
is common across households within an income group. This issue is mitigated by the fact
that, at least using NIPA expenditure as our metric, measurement error is less of an issue
in the 1972-73 survey than in the later waves. (See Meyer and Sullivan, 2009.) Moreover,
we can use NIPA to adjust expenditure for each good j. Specically, we inate or deate
expenditure on good j with a good specic multiplicative constant so that aggregate expen-
diture for each good j in the 1972-73 CE sample equals the corresponding NIPA expenditure
for 1972-73. If this adjustment is not sucient, our estimated elasticities may be biased. To
the extent our elasticities are subject to attenuation bias, we will over-predict expenditure
dierences across income groups. In other words, when we invert the demand system in the
second stage, we will predict expenditure inclusive of the measurement error characteristic
of the 1972-73 survey.10 We revisit the possibility that our estimates are driven by rst-stage
measurement error in Section 5 below.
The second stage of our estimation is to invert the demand system (2) to recover an
estimate of consumption growth post-1980. We rst adjust expenditure for demographics
and pool by income group. Specically, let







lnxhjt   ^  jZh

;
where !ht is the normalized sum of the CE sample weights for demographic group h in year
t, and ^  j is the estimate of  j from (3). That is, ln ^ xijt is the average expenditure of income
10As our unit of observation is an income-demographic cell, we can instrument for expenditure with any
variables that predict expenditure across the income-demographic cells, other than the demographic controls.
The obvious instrument is a cell's (after-tax) income, which is equivalently to averaging over all demographic
cells within an income group. We have explored this specication and found that it generates essentially the
same estimates for the expenditure elasticities.
16group i in year t on good j adjusted for demographics. Using (2), we have




t + "ijt; (5)
where "ijt = 'ijt + vijt= I
H
P
h2i !ht ('hjt + vhjt).11 Given our assumptions, "ijt is indepen-
dent of j. Therefore, we can obtain a consistent estimate of lnX
it, up to a normalization, by
least squares. We only have identication up to a normalization given the presence of jt.12
Note that changes in systematic measurement error over time are captured by good-time
and income group-time dummies. Identication comes from the fact that if the income of
group i increases relative to that of group i0, it will increase its relative expenditure, but the
increase will fall disproportionately on luxuries.
To implement (5), we regress ln ^ xijt on a vector of good-time dummies (whose coecients
correspond to jt), a vector of income-time dummies (whose coecients correspond to i
t),
and the interaction of income-time dummies and j. The coecients of the last group of
variables will be the estimate of lnX
it. To address the issue of normalization, we estimate
expenditure relative to the lowest income group. That is, we have a consistent estimate of
consumption inequality: it  lnX
it   lnX
1t. To estimate trends over time, we restrict i
t
and it to be constant within the windows 1980{1982, 1992{1995, and 2005{2007, but allow
the good-time intercept terms jt to vary year by year. Our two-step procedure requires
adjusting the second stage standard errors, which we do by bootstrapping.13
4.2 Results
Table 2 reports the results of our rst stage estimates of each good's total expenditure
elasticity. The table also includes the average share of each good out of total expenditure
for our 1972-73 CE sample. The rst column of estimates uses the reported expenditure
in the CE. The second column of estimates adjusts each good by a constant proportion
to bring the aggregate CE expenditure for each good in line with its share in the national
income and product accounts. We base this adjustment on conversion factors reported in
Meyer and Sullivan (2009). This only aects the estimated elasticities through any aect
on the distribution of total household expenditures, our right hand side variable. As can be
seen from the table, this adjustment does not have a substantial impact on the estimated
11The residual term will also contain estimation error related to ^  j, which we suppress in the notation.
12That is, the mean of lnX
it is not identied as jt + j lnX
it = jt   j + j (lnX
it + ).
13Specically, we draw with replacement from the micro data for all years and re-estimate both stages. In a
previous version, we adjusted the standard errors following Murphy and Topel (1985). Neither methodology
implies a substantial adjustment to the standard errors.
17elasticities. The standard errors reported next to each estimate suggest that our rst stage
has a fair degree of precision, particularly for the goods with large expenditure shares.
The estimated elasticities range from 0.25 for tobacco to about 2.0 for non-durable en-
tertainment, education, and charitable contributions. Consistent with other studies, food
at home has a fairly low expenditure elasticity (0.48), while food away from home has a
high elasticity (1.45). Vehicle purchases is also a large category with a fairly high income
elasticity. Housing services, our largest expenditure category, has an expenditure elasticity
of 1.
To provide a sense of how these expenditure elasticities are informative about relative
consumption inequality, we rst consider two goods { food at home and non-durable en-
tertainment. These goods have reasonably large shares and very dierent expenditure elas-
ticities. We plot the relative expenditure (high income to low income) for each good in
gure 3, along with the ratio for total expenditures. Food at home shows essentially no
change between 1980 and 2007, implying equal growth rates for high income and low income
households. Conversely, over this period high income households substantially increased
entertainment expenditure relative to low income households. Specically, the log ratio of
expenditure on entertainment increased 0.75 log points.
On the one hand, the stable ratio of food at home expenditure suggests little change
in consumption inequality. On the other hand, the dramatic rise in relative entertainment
expenditures suggests the opposite { even with the large expenditure elasticity of 2.0, this
change in entertainment expenditure still implies an increase in consumption inequality of
38 percent. However, in the terminology of the previous subsection, both these series are
contaminated with systematic measurement error.
To see what we can learn from these two series, recall from equation (5) that lnxijt =
jt + i
t + j lnX
it + "ijt, for each good j and income group i.14 The series depicted in
gure 3 are ratios of high income spending to low income spending for the same good, so
they are already cleaned of the good specic intercepts. Dierencing across the two goods
eliminates the income specic measurement error i. An unbiased estimate of the change in
consumption inequality is therefore the change in relative entertainment expenditure minus
the change in food at home, all divided by the dierence in expenditure elasticities. We
perform this calculation for 2005-2007 versus 1980-82. The change in consumption inequality
implied by relative spending on entertainment and food is 0.48 log points, nearly three times
the 0.17 log point change implied by reported expenditure, and even considerably larger than
14We are omitting the demographic shifters for this two-good exercise.
18the 33 percent change in disposable income inequality.
While food at home and non-durable entertainment are informative due to their large
dierence in expenditure elasticities, they represent only two of our expenditure categories.
Using all goods reduces the impact of the idiosyncratic error terms and provides more pre-
cise estimates. Table 3 reports our second stage regression estimates of the log change in
consumption inequality from (5).15 We focus on the change in consumption inequality be-
tween the highest income and lowest income groups relative to 1980-82, and discuss other
inter-group comparisons below. The rst row of table 3 reports the estimated inequality in
the pooled base period 1980{1982. This is the estimate of lnX
5   lnX
1 for the rst three
years of our sample. The row labeled \Log Change 1980{1995" is the estimated change in
inequality between 1980-82 and 1992-95. Similarly, the row labelled \Log Change 1980{
2007" corresponds to the estimated change in consumption inequality between 1980-82 and
2005-07.
Column (1) reports the second stage estimates using ordinary least squares. The rst
row reports the estimated log inequality in the pooled period 1980{1982, which is 0.95. For
comparison, table 1 reports a log ratio of ln(2.47)=0.90 for 1980-82, which diers from our
second stage point estimate for that period by only 0.05 points. This implies that the level
of consumption inequality estimated with our two-step procedure is similar to that obtained
from reported expenditure for the beginning of our sample. This similarity, however, does
not persist over time. The next two rows of estimates in column (1) report that the estimated
change in consumption inequality is 19 percent for the early period and 32 percent for the full
sample. These numbers are close to those for after tax income reported in table 1, and dier
from changes in reported consumption inequality. One issue with OLS is that it weights all
goods equally in the second stage. This raises the question of whether goods with small shares
or greater heteroscedasticity are driving the results. Column (2) estimates the second stage
using two-step feasible generalized least squares. Specically, we allow heteroscedasticity
across goods to capture that the size of taste shocks or idiosyncratic measurement error may
dier across goods. To estimate good-specic residual variances, we use residuals from the
OLS specication of column (1). We use these to weight the nal estimation. GLS implies
an initial log inequality of 0.94, and an increase in inequality in the rst half of the sample
of 23 percent, and a full-sample increase of 29 percent. The GLS estimates suggest a little
more increase in the rst half of the sample, but a similar full-sample increase as the OLS
estimate.
15We only report estimates using our benchmark elasticities (column (1) of table 2). As can be surmised
from the fact that the two columns of table 2 are nearly identical, the second stage estimates using column
(2) elasticities are also similar to the benchmark estimates, and we therefore omit them.
19Column (3) performs the same GLS regression but excludes categories that contain
durables.16 Non-durable consumption avoids the issue of imputed service ow that com-
plicates measures of durable consumption. But, because we maintain the same rst stage,
these estimates are still of total consumption inequality, not just non-durable consumption
inequality. We nd that the estimated increase in inequality is stable to this alternative sam-
ple. Specically, we nd a 23 percent increase in inequality in the rst half of the sample,
and 31 percent over the full sample.
The nal column of table 3 implements weighted least squares, where the weights reect
the share of each good in personal consumption expenditures (PCE) from the national income
accounts. Specically, we calculate the share of each good out of total PCE for each year,
then average the shares over the sample period 1980-2007 and use these shares to weight the
goods in the second stage regression. For health expenditures we downweight its share for
each year to a factor equal to the share of private expenditures, out of pocket and private
insurance, out of total national health expenditures; this factor averages 49 percent for
1980-2007.17 The baseline log inequality is slightly lower (0.90) in this specication, and the
corresponding increase over time slightly lower as well. Specically, we estimate a change in
consumption inequality of 18 percent for the early period, and 26 percent for the full sample.
The second stage estimation uses all ve income categories, and therefore produces an
estimate of inequality across any two income groups. For example, the OLS point estimates
suggest that consumption inequality between the middle income group and the low income
group increased by 0.03 points between 1980-82 and 2005-07. The GLS estimate is higher, at
0.09. These estimates are not markedly dierent than those obtained using the CE expendi-
ture data directly. As discussed at the end of section 3.1, the reported increase in inequality
for the 50-10 ratio is 0.04 over this period. This implies that the two-step estimation has the
greatest impact at the top of the income distribution. Specically, reported CE expenditure
implies an increase in consumption inequality between the top and middle income groups of
0.13 log points between 1980-82 and 2005-2007, while our two-step estimation suggests an
increase of 0.29 log points for OLS and 0.20 for GLS.
Table 4 report the estimates for income-specic measurement error, i
t. In particular, we
report the dierence between the highest income group and the lowest income group: 5 1.
These are the coecients on the income group dummies on their own and not interacted with
j. The rows and columns are arranged in the same manner as in table 3. The rst row is the
16Specically, from the goods listed in table 2, we exclude vehicles, appliances, furniture, and entertainment
equipment.
17The data source is Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, Oce of the Actuary, National Health
Statistics Group
20estimated level in 1980-82, and the remaining two rows of estimates report the changes over
time. The rst row point estimates suggest that (relative) income-specic mis-measurement
is not substantial early in the sample. The point estimates are small and not statistically
dierent from zero. This is consistent with the fact that log consumption inequality reported
in the rst row of table 3 is similar to that calculated from direct responses and reported
in levels in table 1. However, the relative measurement error increases in magnitude over
time, representing a substantial problem by the end of the sample. For example the OLS
specication, column (1), suggests that relative mis-measurement increases by 27 log points
by 2005-2007 in the direction of under-reporting of high income expenditure or over-reporting
of low income expenditure. A similar pattern is reported for the other specications. (The
weighted least squares reports the smallest change, -0.14, which is consistent with the fact
that it also reports a smaller implied increase in inequality in table 3.) The results imply
that relative under-measurement of high income expenditure is growing over time, with an
increase of 10 log points in the rst half of the sample, and 27 log points for the entire
sample, using the OLS estimates.18 These measurement error estimates are the ip side
of the dierence between table 3 and 1. The fact that our estimation suggests a greater
increase in inequality over time than is suggested by reported total expenditures implies
that income-group mis-measurement is growing larger over time (in the direction of under-
reporting inequality).
5 Discussion and Conclusion
The results of the previous section suggest that increases in consumption inequality may mir-
ror that of income inequality to a greater extent than implied by reported total expenditure.
The Engel curve approach has a number of advantages as well as potential limitations. On
the positive side, it allows us to use the detailed expenditure reports on dierent classes of
goods to correct for income-specic measurement error. The attraction of the CE is that it is
a comprehensive survey of expenditure across many goods, and this richness can be exploited
using a simple demand system. Moreover, the results of the budget constraint accounting
suggest that some care is warranted in interpreting the overall expenditure numbers. The
demand system analysis assesses the extent to which systematic measurement error is behind
18This 27 point increase can be broken down into 6 points for the relative mis-measurement between the
middle and bottom income groups, and 21 for the high-middle comparison. For GLS, the 22 point increase
can be broken down into 11 points for the middle-bottom comparison, and 11 points for the high-middle
comparison. This is consistent with the discussion above regarding that our two stage correction has the
greatest impact on the top half of the income distribution using OLS, while GLS yields a more balanced
decomposition.
21the failure of the budget constraint.
A key assumption is the validity of our Engel curve estimates. We use the 1972-73 CE in
order to avoid the contamination of our rst stage estimates with the suspected measurement
error in the later waves of the CE. This raises the question of whether the earlier CE is also
subject to measurement error that may potentially bias our rst-stage elasticities. One way
to assess the implications of this potential bias is to assume that our second stage results
are only due to mis-measurement in 1972-73. That is, the reported change in consumption
inequality using total expenditure is accurate, and our two-stage results dier only due to
mis-measured income elasticities reecting measurement error in 1972/73.
To see what this implies, consider that our OLS estimate of the change in inequality is
1.9 times that obtained from reported expenditure (0.32 versus 0.17). We can generate this
as a spurious result by assuming reported total expenditure in the 1972-73 CE overstates
the log consumption gap between high income and low income households in those years
by a factor of 1.9. That is, lnXi = 1:9lnX
i   b, where Xi is reported expenditure, X
i is
true expenditure, and b is an arbitrary adjustment to the mean (to reect, for example, that
the 1972-73 CE aggregate expenditure is not very dierent from that implied by NIPA).
Such mis-measurement would bias down our rst stage elasticities, and bias up our second
stage estimates of inequality by the same factor of 1.9, explaining the gap between tables
1 and 3. However, such an interpretation has fairly extreme predictions for consumption
and savings behavior in 1972-73. For example, using reported expenditures, the implied
savings rate in 1972-73 was 24 percent for high income households and -12 percent for low
income households. Picking our b parameter to keep aggregate consumption unchanged,
our hypothetical mis-measurement in 1972-73 implies that we should adjust consumption of
the high income group downward by 14 percent and consumption of the low income group
upwards by 37 percent. In turn, this implies increasing the savings rate for high income
households from 24 to 34 percent and decreasing the savings rates of low income households
from -12 all the way down to -54 percent. That is, such a re-interpretation of our results
requires an extreme (and arguably implausible) savings gap in 1972-73.
Yet another alternative interpretation is that our rst stage is mis-specied. As noted
above, the log-linear specication is necessarily a local approximation, unless all elasticities
are one. However, if we assume that expenditure elasticities revert towards one along a
growth path, then we are overstating the heterogeneity in expenditure elasticities in later
years. This biases down our measure of consumption inequality over time, leading to an
understatement of the increase in inequality. It would take a fanning out of elasticities to
generate an over-estimation of the increase in inequality. More generally, our estimation
22states that high income households are shifting their expenditure towards certain goods
relative to low income households. These shifts are not random, but are concentrated toward
goods that have higher expenditure elasticities in our 1972-73 sample. One could construct
scenarios in which these shifts are driven by instability in expenditure elasticities, but such
scenarios would not resolve the budget constraint violations documented in section 3, nor
directly address the fact that the micro data is increasingly at odds with aggregate measures
of consumption. The income-specic measurement error approach that we have explored in
this paper is a parsimonious explanation that speaks to both the observed relative shifts in
consumption composition as well as the measurement issues suggested by budget constraint
accounting. The results suggest that the increase in consumption inequality has been large
and of a similar magnitude as the observed change in income inequality.
Data Appendix
In this appendix we describe construction of the variables in our data set and the impact
of sample restrictions on our samples for 1972-73 and for 1980-2007. Unless noted, the
descriptions apply to all years of the data. All data is available from the authors' web page.
Construction of variables from CE
The income variables we examine are total household labor earnings, total household income
before tax, and total household income after tax. These variables are principally based on
responses in the last quarterly interview that cover income from the previous 12 months.
Household labor income sums all household member earnings, before deductions, over the
past 12 months. The before-tax income in the CE (FINCBTAX) includes labor earnings,
business (including farm), and professional income, interest, dividend, rental, and royalty
income, income from social security and railroad retirement benets, income from pensions
and annuities, scholarships or stipends, workers' compensation and veterans' benets, and
alimony and child support received. It also includes the following transfer payments: public
assistance (welfare) payments including those related to job training, food stamps, supple-
mental security income, and unemployment benets.
We adjust this measure of before tax income in the following ways to be consistent
with budget accounting. We add in food as pay and other money receipts. The latter
includes lump-sum receipts of alimony and child support, lump-sum receipts from estates,
23selling household items, prizes or gambling winnings, and refunds of insurance payments,
property taxes, or employer over withholding on social security taxes. We subtract alimony
and child support payments, to be consistent with those receipts being treated as income.
We also subtract expenditures that we do not treat as consumption. These include life
insurance premiums, occupational expenses, fees for nancial services, nance charges, legal
fees, funeral expenses, moving expenses, and support for college students. We treat the
implicit rental from owner-occupied housing both as a component of expenditures and a
part of income. So we add home owner's estimate of rental equivalence to before tax income.
At the same time we subtract expenses of home ownership for mortgage interest, property
taxes, expenditures for capital repairs and replacements, home insurance, security systems,
pest control, and other maintenance expenses both from income and expenditures.
We subtract personal taxes from our measure of before tax income to arrive at a measure
of after tax income. These taxes include federal, state and local income taxes. We also
subtract the income contributed to social security by all household members during the year,
as well as contributions for government or railroad retirement programs. The CE measure
of social security contributions is estimated by the BLS. Contributions for government and
railroad retirement programs is annualized by the BLS based on deductions for household
members in the most recent pay period. Our measure of after tax income diers from the
CE measure (FINCATAX) due to all the adjustments listed above to before tax income, and
because we subtract contributions to social security, government, and railroad retirement
programs. We consider an alternative measure of after tax income by replacing self-reported
federal income taxes with taxes calculated from the NBER's TAXSIM program. We do not
adjust for state and local taxes, as we do not know the state of residence for many households
in the CE. We also considered replacing social security taxes with TAXSIM values, but this
has little eect on the results. This is not surprising, as the social security contributions in
the CE are estimated by the BLS as well.
We aggregate CE expenditure items into 20 groups, as described in the text. Our de-
nitions of expenditures by good closely follow denitions in the CE with a few exceptions,
most notably for housing services. As in the CE, for renters we dene housing by rent paid.
But for home owners we use self-reported rental equivalence rather than out of pocket ex-
penditures. This adjustment was described above in discussing adjustment to income. For
the eight quarterly surveys conducted in 1980 and 1981 households were not asked about
rental equivalence. We impute the rental equivalence for homeowners in these early waves
as follows. We use the the two years of surveys conducted in 1982 and 1983 and regress
reported rental equivalence on total expenditures minus out of pocket housing expenditure,
24after tax income, and a set of dummies for age, marital status, family size, and number of
earners. We then t this regression for the earlier waves that do not report a housing service
measure. For vacation homes there is no measure of self-reported rental equivalence before
1999. So, for all years, we measure expenditures on vacation homes, like the CE, based on
expenditures for mortgage interest, taxes, and maintenance.
We dier from the CE measure of expenditures on vehicles in that we subtract the value
of used vehicles that are sold by a household, even when this is separate from any vehicle
purchase. (Both our measure and the CE expenditure on vehicles, by using net payments
for vehicle purchases, implicitly deducts the value of vehicles traded in as part of purchases.)
We also adjust the reported expenditures on food at home in the CE for the 1982 to 1987
waves. Spending on food at home shows a distinct drop for these waves, apparently reecting
a dierence in the questionnaire wording from other waves. To adjust for this drop, we
increase food at home expenditure by 11% for these waves. This 11% adjustment is derived
from a regression for surveys 1980 to 1989 of log food at home expenditures on log after-tax
income, log total expenditure, quadratic time trends, and a zero/one dummy variable that
equals one for the waves from 1982 to 1987. This adjustment is similar to that in Krueger
and Perri (2006).
Our measure of total expenditure will dier from the BLS measure of total expenditure
in the CE (TOTEXP) due to these adjustments. It also diers because we treat a set of
expenditures (e.g., alimony payments, life insurance, nancial fees, social security contribu-
tions) as deductions from income, rather than as consumption expenditures. We also treat
payments to private pensions as a component of savings, whereas the CE includes these as
part of total expenditure.
The CE asks respondents a number of questions on active savings. The BLS employs
these responses to publish statistics on net changes in assets and liabilities (see addenda to
Current Expenditure Tables, www.bls.gov/cex/home.htm#tables). In each quarterly inter-
view, households report the net change in savings accounts and purchases and sales of stocks
and other nancial assets. In addition, households report new loans undertaken, includ-
ing mortgages and home equity loans, and reports equity payments against mortgages and
other loans. Households also report purchases and sales of real assets including houses, busi-
nesses, home improvements, and vehicles. They report the net changes in money borrowed
or loaned to other households. The CE records the total outstanding credit balances in the
rst and fourth interviews covering expenditures, which are 9 months apart. We estimate
net payments of credit by subtracting the fourth interview's value from that in the rst,
and annualize by multiplying by 4/3. (Because all other responses for savings already reect
25changes in assets or changes in liabilities, these do not require dierencing across interviews.)
Our measure of net changes in assets and liabilities diers in a couple respects from the
CE measures reected in BLS published statistics. The primary dierence is that we add
payments into private pensions as a form of savings (not as a component of expenditures).
Secondly, we do not include net purchases of vehicles, as we treat these as a component of
expenditures.
As discussed in the text, the data on new mortgages in the CE raise the question of
whether the CE accurately records the net eect of renancing on savings. We observe
a number of reported new mortgages without a corresponding purchase of a house or a
signicant paying down of an existing mortgage. The CE data imply an average \cash out"
percentage of 73 percent from new mortgages not associated with a house purchase, a rate
not supported by studies of renancing. (For instance, Greenspan and Kennedy, 2007, nds
that 13 percent of the value of new mortgages is taken in the form of cash, not used to
pay o existing mortgages or to pay related fees.) To address this potential measurement
error, we construct an alternative measure of household savings that caps the amount of net
borrowing (cash out) associated with new mortgages at one third the size of that mortgage.
This reduces the average implied cash out ratio of renanced mortgages to 14 percent, close
to the number reported by Greenspan and Kennedy (2007).
Lastly, we create demographic variables for age of the reference person (identied by who
owns or rents the residence), the number of household members, and number of household
earners, with all variables based on responses in the households nal quarterly interval. (For
the 1972-73 surveys these variables are dened by the rst household interview; so we add
one year to the reference person's age.) These variables are used to divide households within
each of ve income groups into cells, as described in the text.
The impact of sample restrictions
We impose a set of sample restrictions; the impact of these restrictions is reported Table A
1. We begin with 19,975 households for 1972-73 surveys and about 225,443 households for
1980-2007 surveys. We aggregate expenditures for each household across the four interviews{
so each household appears only once in the sample. There is considerable attrition across
surveys, especially for the latter surveys. For the 1980-2007 surveys, the BLS responds to
attrition by introducing households with the second, or later, survey instrument, so as to
keep a balanced panel across interview quarters. Focusing on households that begin with the
26rst survey instrument reduces the potential sample of households to 165,638 for 1980-2007.
We make the following restrictions on these samples. The 1981 through 1983 surveys
include only urban households. For consistency we restrict the samples to urban households
for their entirety. This reduces the 1972-73 sample by 16 percent to 16,809 and the 1980-
2007 sample by 9 percent to 150,465. We restrict households to those with reference persons
between the ages of 25 and 64, reducing the sample for 1972-73 by 27 percent to 12,220
and for 1980-2007 by 28 percent to 108,156. In order to contrast household expenditures
with income, it is necessary to have measures of expenditures and income over comparable
periods. In turn this requires that households participate in all four interviews in order
to be present for the income variables in the nal interview. This reduces the 1972-73
sample by 3 percent, to 11,898, and the 1980-2007 sample by 31 percent, to 74,422. We
require households to be \complete income reporters," which the BLS denes as respondents
with values for some major source of income, such as wages, self-employment income, or
Social Security income. (Even complete income reporters might not have provided full
accounting for all household members.) This restriction reduces the 1972-73 sample by 6
percent to 11,182 and the 1980-2007 sample by 14 percent to 63,794. We drop households
that report implausibly large spending on smaller goods categories. More exactly, we require
that households spend less than half of their after tax income on any category, unless it is
housing, food, or vehicle purchases. This restriction reduces the sample for 1972-73 by 2
percent to 10,978 and the 1980-2007 sample by 4 percent to 61,064. (Of those eliminated,
28 households showed negative after tax income for the 1972-73 sample, 857 households did
so for 1980-2007.) Lastly, in order to eliminate outliers and to mitigate the impact of time-
varying top-coding, we exclude households in the top and bottom ve percent of the before
tax income distribution. (The fraction of households top coded on income uctuates from
about one to just over four percent across survey waves.) This results in a sample of 9,845
households for 1972-73 and 55,003 households for 1980-2007.
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29Table 1: Trends in Inequality { Ratio of High Income to Low Income Respondents
Log Change Log Change
1980{82 1992{1995 2005{2007 1980{1995 1980{2007
Labor Earnings 6.43 8.57 7.88 0.29 0.20
Before Tax Income 4.76 5.87 6.40 0.21 0.30
After Tax Income 4.21 5.13 5.87 0.20 0.33
Consumption
Expenditures 2.47 2.80 2.93 0.13 0.17
Income minus
Savings 4.20 5.09 5.54 0.19 0.28
Income minus
Savings
(adjusted) 4.22 4.83 5.45 0.13 0.26
Note: High income refers to respondents who report before tax household income in the 80th through 95th
percentiles. Low income refers to respondents in the 5th through 25th percentiles. The elements of the
rst three columns are the ratio of the average of high income respondents to the average for low income
respondents, where the averages are taken over the pooled years indicated at the head of the respective
column. The last two columns are the log change in the rst two columns and the rst and third columns,
respectively. All variables are converted into constant dollars before averaging. The row labeled Income
minus Savings is reported after tax income minus reported savings. The nal row, labeled Income minus
Saving (adjusted) limits the amount of cash taken out of renanced mortgages, as described in the text.
Denitions of each series and sample construction are given in the data section.
30Table 2: Engel Curves from 1972/1973 Expenditure Survey
1972/1973
Good Category CE Share (1) (2)
Housing 20.8 0.99 (0.03) 0.95 (0.03)
Food at home 15.6 0.48 (0.03) 0.45 (0.03)
Vehicle purchasing, leasing, insurance 10.7 1.48 (0.07) 1.40 (0.07)
All other transportation 9.8 0.97 (0.03) 0.93 (0.03)
Food away from home 5.2 1.45 (0.05) 1.41 (0.04)
Health expenditures including insurance 5.2 0.99 (0.06) 0.94 (0.06)
Utilities 4.5 0.68 (0.05) 0.63 (0.05)
Applicances, phones, computers, with
services 4.4 0.70 (0.03) 0.68 (0.03)
Men's and women's clothing 4.3 1.42 (0.04) 1.38 (0.04)
Furniture and xtures 2.9 1.74 (0.07) 1.67 (0.07)
Shoes and other apparel 2.8 0.89 (0.04) 0.88 (0.04)
Entertainment equipment and subscription
television 2.8 1.19 (0.06) 1.15 (0.06)
Entertainment fees, admissions, reading 2.1 2.00 (0.06) 1.94 (0.06)
Domestic services and childcare 1.8 1.39 (0.16) 1.37 (0.15)
Tobacco, other smoking 1.6 0.25 (0.05) 0.24 (0.05)
Children's clothing (up to age 15) 1.4 0.36 (0.09) 0.34 (0.09)
Education 1.3 2.10 (0.24) 2.02 (0.23)
Personal care 1.2 1.08 (0.06) 1.04 (0.06)
Alcoholic beverages 1.0 1.49 (0.09) 1.49 (0.08)
Cash contributions, not for alimony/support 0.5 2.07 (0.15) 2.01 (0.14)
Total expenditure adjusted based on NIPA? No No Yes
Note: The rst column presents each goods average share of total expenditure for 1972-73, calculated as
the cross-sectional average expenditure on each good for each year divided by average total expenditure for
that year and then averaged across years. The remaining columns report two alternative estimates of each
goods expenditure elasticity, with associated standard errors in parentheses. Column (1) uses the reported
expenditure data, while column (2) adjusts expenditure on each good by a constant multiple to ensure
aggregate expenditure equals NIPA expenditure. The data come from the 1972 and 1973 CE surveys. See
text for details of sample construction and regression specication. All specications include demographic
control dummies for age, household size, and number of earners.
31Table 3: Trends in Consumption Inequality Based on Relative Expenditure Patterns
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log Inequality 1980{1982 0.95 0.94 0.97 0.90
( 0.09) ( 0.08) ( 0.08) ( 0.07)
Log Change 1980{1995 0.19 0.23 0.23 0.18
( 0.09) ( 0.08) ( 0.08) ( 0.07)
Log Change 1980{2007 0.32 0.29 0.31 0.26
( 0.09) ( 0.08) ( 0.08) ( 0.07)
Categories Included All All Those All
without durables
Specication OLS GLS GLS WLS
(NIPA Shares)
Note: This table reports the estimated change in income inequality obtained from the second stage re-
gressions. The estimated parameters represent the relative growth in total expenditure for high income
households relative to low income households. See the specication in the text for full details. The rst
column implements the second stage by OLS; the second column implements the second stage using two-
step generalized least squares, where we allow expenditure on each good to have its own residual variance;
the third column implements GLS while omitting all good categories containing durables; the last column
implements weighted least squares, using the average NIPA for 1980{2007 shares as weights. Standard errors
are calculated using a bootstrap with 500 replications.
32Table 4: Change in Relative Income-Specic Measurement Error
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Relative Mis-Measurment 1980{1982
High Income   Low Income 0.01 0.01 -0.04 0.04
( 0.08) ( 0.08) ( 0.08) ( 0.06)
Change 1980{1995 -0.10 -0.14 -0.13 -0.07
( 0.09) ( 0.08) ( 0.08) ( 0.07)
Change 1980{2007 -0.27 -0.22 -0.22 -0.14
( 0.09) ( 0.08) ( 0.08) ( 0.07)
Categories Included All All Those All
without durables
Specication OLS GLS GLS WLS
(NIPA Shares)
Note: This table reports the change in the estimated income-specic measurement error for high income
respondents relative to low income respondents: 5   1 from equation (5). The specication for each
column is the same as in table 3. The rst row is the level for the period 1980-82, and the next two
rows report the change in the levels between 1980-82 and 1992-95 and 1980-82 and 2005-07, respectively.
Standard errors are calculated using a bootstrap with 500 replications.
33Table A 1: Sample Construction
1972-73 1980-2007
Total Number of Households 19,975 225,443
Households who enter at \rst" interview" NA 165,683
After Sample Restriction:
Urban 16,809 150,465
Ages 25 to 64 12,220 108,156
Full-year of Interview Coverage 11,898 74,422
Complete Income Reporter 11,182 63,794
No Expenditure Outliers 10,978 61,064
Truncate Before-Tax Income: 5-95 pctile (Final Sample) 9,845 55,003
Note: This table reports the sample size after each restriction. The rst row reports the original CE sample
obtained from the BLS. Each sample restriction is discussed in the data appendix. The nal row represents
the sample used in the analysis.
34Figure 1: Trends in Inequality



















Note: This gure depicts the ratio of high income to low income respondents reported labor earnings,
before tax income, after tax income, income minus savings, NIPA adjusted consumption expenditures, and
consumption expenditures. High income refers to respondents who report before tax household income in the
80th through 95th percentiles. Low income refers to respondents in the 5th through 25th percentiles. The
income minus saving (Y-S) sample uses the adjusted mortgage series as described in the text. Denitions of
each series and sample construction are given in the data section.
35Figure 2: Mean Saving Rates


















Note: This gure depicts the mean savings rates. The line labeled 1-C/Y refers to implied savings computed
as after tax income minus reported consumption expenditures. The line labeled \Flow of Funds" is the ow
of funds aggregate private savings rate out of disposable income. The lines labeled S/Y refer to average
reported savings divided by average reported after tax income. Adjusted and unadjusted refer to whether
we adjust reported new mortgages, as described in the data section of the text. Denitions of each series
and sample construction are given in the data section of the text.
36Figure 3: Food and Entertainment Expenditure { Ratio of High Income Households to Low
Income Households

















Note: This gure depicts the relative spending of high and low income households on nondurable entertain-
ment and food at home, as well as total expenditures. Points are averaged over 3 year spans centered on the
corresponding horizontal axis label. The year 1993 corresponds to the four year average 1992{1995.
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